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The U.S. has experienced a robust acceleration in its productivity growth
rate during the 1990s in a context in which Information and Communications
Technologies (ICT) investment have been very important. Jorgenson and
Stiroh (2000) and Jorgenson (2001), among others, have related the increase
in the U.S. productivity growth since the mid-1990s to the growth rate of
investment in ICT and the rise in total factor productivity (TFP) growth,
mainly in ICT-goods production sector. Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Baily
and Lawrence (2001) have extended these positive e⁄ects to the non-ICT
production sector of the U.S. economy.
However, in spite of the general view that ICT implies a new technolog-
ical revolution, the measured impact of ICT on aggregate productivity has
been very limited so far and their e⁄ects take long to become visible in the
macro-economic aggregates. In this regard, the statement by Robert Solow is
probably one of the most categorical: "You can see the computer age every-
where these days, except in the productivity statistics" (New York Times
Book Review, July 12th 1987). Even for the successful cases, some papers
have found that the positive impact of ICT on growth is not as straightfor-
ward as expected, but a number of issues appear as necessary conditions to
be hold. For instance, according to Hornstein and Krusell (1996), an increase
in the technological change can produce a temporary productivity slowdown
given that average knowledge goes down because relatively more resources
are allocated to the new capital (see also Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997,
and Yorukoglu, 1998). Other papers have emphasized that the answer might
be related to changes in new forms of organization at plant level which are
required to obtain the full bene￿ts from ICT (Samaniego, 2006). In fact,
this historical episode has already taken place in other economies (see Kiley,
2001, for a survey). In general, many of them present the adoption of ICT as
a technological revolution with substantial short-run negative e⁄ects until
the new equipments have been completely adapted. The transitional dy-
namics from changes in technological progress lead to a slowdown in capital
accumulation and thus in productivity during the transition period. Ac-
cording to this line of research, Pakko (2002a and b) using a model with
stochastic growth trends, shows that changes in the growth rate of techno-
logical progress may not a⁄ect productivity contemporaneously, but with a
lag.
In the literature we ￿nd two di⁄erent approaches to study the e⁄ects of
technological change on output and productivity growth. The ￿rst approach
and the more widely used is the traditional growth accounting, in which out-
put or productivity growth is decomposed in terms of the share-weighted
growth in inputs. Examples of this approach are Jorgenson and Stiroh
(2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000), Daveri (2002), Colecchia and Schreyer








 others. The other approach use dynamic general equilibrium models to
quantify the contribution to growth of speci￿c-technological change. As
pointed out by Cummins and Violante (2002), one disadvantage of tradi-
tional growth accounting is that it does not isolate the underlying sources
of capital accumulation.
This paper studies the impact of ICT on the U.S. productivity growth
using a computable dynamic general equilibrium model. Papers by Green-
wood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997, 2000), Kiley (2001), Pakko (2005) -all of
them calibrated for the U. S. economy-, Carlaw and Kosempel (2004) for the
Canadian economy, Bakhshi and Larsen (2005) for the U.K. economy and
Mart￿nez, Rodr￿guez and Torres (2008) for the Spanish economy, provide
examples of this methodology applied to technological changes. Greenwood
et al. (1997) for the period 1954-1990 obtained that neutral-technological
change accounts for a 42% of total productivity growth, whereas the remain-
ing 58% of productivity growth can be attributed to speci￿c-technological
change. Using a similar analysis for the U.K. economy, Bakhshi and Larsen
(2005) obtained that speci￿c technological change was around 20-30% of to-
tal labor productivity growth for the period 1976-1998. Both papers consider
that capital is disaggregated into ICT and non-ICT assets, where speci￿c-
technological progress is solely motivated by the ICT capital. Finally, in
analyzing the Spanish productivity slowdown during 1995-2004, Mart￿nez et
al. (2008), using an extended framework of that of Greenwood et al. (1997),
￿nd that despite of a rapid growth rates of ICT investment, speci￿c technol-
ogy growth in those assets is not providing much support for overall output
growth in Spain. When the dynamics of productivity is decomposed into
implicit and neutral technological progress, the former exerts a positive im-
pact while the latter has a clear negative dominant e⁄ect. Behind the small
contribution of implicit technological change, they ￿nd a modest negative
impact coming from the traditional capital inputs, while communications
and mainly hardware equipment appear as signi￿cant growth-enhancing as-
sets.
This paper extends the work of Greenwood et al. (1997) for the U.S.
economy where productivity is decomposed along the balanced growth path
of the economy into investment-speci￿c technological change and neutral
technological progress. They distinguish between two types of capital: equip-
ment and structures, where speci￿c technological progress is only associ-
ated to equipment. On this basis, we use a more disaggregated production
function with six capital assets, three of them corresponding to ICT assets
(hardware, software and communications equipment) and three non-ICT
capital goods (constructions and structures, machinery and transport equip-
ment). Moreover, we consider the existence of investment-speci￿c technolog-
ical progress to all capital assets. Therefore, we split the labor productivity
growth into seven factors: neutral technological change plus six-speci￿c or








 provide a more appropriate measure of the sources of productivity growth.
This way allows us studying the contribution to growth from ICT versus
non-ICT capital assets.
On the basis of model calibration over the period 1980-2004, our main
results show that ICT-speci￿c technological change accounts for about 36%
of total productivity growth, whereas non-ICT-speci￿c technological change
accounts for only 7% of total productivity growth. These results imply that
neutral technological change accounts for a 57% of total labor productivity
growth, whereas 43% of productivity growth can be attributed to speci￿c
technological change (i.e. 36% + 7%), most of them due to technological
change embedded in hardware equipment. When the sample is spitted into
two sub-periods, 1980-1995 and 1995-2004, we obtain that ICT contribution
to productivity growth increases, whereas non-ICT contribution decreases.
These results support the view of the increasing importance of ICT as a
leading force of the U.S. productivity growth over the last years. We also
￿nd that TFP contribution is larger in the second subperiod. Therefore, the
discrepancies in our ￿ndings with respect to those achieved by Greenwood
et al. (1997) mainly re￿ ect di⁄erences in the sample period. Provided that
we use a more disaggregated portfolio than the one proposed by them, that
decompose capital into structures and equipment, we check whether our
results are due to this particular portfolio, and ￿nd that our results are
fairly robust to the disaggregation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model, in which six types of capital are considered, with the characteriza-
tion of its balanced growth path. Section 3 shows the calibration exercise.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 provides some additional evidence
using di⁄erent levels of aggregation of capital assets. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
Following Greenwood et al. (1997) we use a neoclassical growth model in
which two key elements are present: the existence of di⁄erent types of capital
and the presence of technological change speci￿c to the production of capital.
In particular, we use the extension of the model developed in Mart￿nez et
al. (2008), which incorporate two new features. First, while Greenwood
et al. (1997) disaggregate capital assets in structures and equipment, we
distinguish among six di⁄erent types of capital inputs. This implies a larger
disaggregation of capital inputs than the one used in previous similar works.
Therefore, our production function relates output with seven inputs: L is
labor in hours worked; K1 constructions and non residential buildings; K2
transport equipment; K3 machinery and other equipment; K4 hardware and








 The ￿rst three types of capital are grouped into non-ICT capital inputs,
whereas the remaining three ones are ICT inputs.
Second, we consider the investment-speci￿c technological change asso-
ciated to each capital input. Denote Qi as the price of asset i in terms of
the amount of it which can be purchased by one unit of output. This price
re￿ ects the current state of technology for producing each asset. Greenwood
et al. (1997) consider that this price is constant for structures, but is al-
lowed to vary for equipment assets. Note that, according to this de￿nition,
equipment embodies both ICT and non-ICT inputs.
2.1 Household
The economy is inhabited by an in￿nitely lived, representative household
who has time-separable preferences in terms of consumption of ￿nal goods,
fCtg
1
t=0, and leisure, fOtg
1




￿t [￿ logCt + (1 ￿ ￿)logOt]; (1)
where ￿ is the discount factor and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure. Private consumption is denoted by Ct.
Leisure is Ot = NtH ￿ Lt; where H is the number of e⁄ective hours in the
year (H = 96 ￿ 52 = 4992), times population in the age of taking labor-
leisure decisions (Nt), minus the aggregated number of hours worked a year
(Lt = Ntht, with ht representing annual hours worked per worker).
The budget constraint faced by the consumer says that consumption and
investment cannot exceed the sum of labor and capital rental income net of
taxes and lump-sum transfers:












Ri;tKi;t + Tt; (2)
where It =
P6
i=1 Ii;t is total investment in the six types of capital, Tt is the
transfer received by consumers from the government, Wt is the wage, Ri;t is
the rental price of asset type i, and ￿c;￿l;￿k, are the consumption tax, the
labor income tax and the capital income tax, respectively. Note that capital
income has six components, each of them with a di⁄erent rental rate, Ri;t.
A key point of the model is that capital holdings evolve according to:
fKi;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿i)Ki;t + Qi;tIi;tg
6
i=1 ; (3)
where ￿i is the depreciation rate of asset i. Following Greenwood et al.
(1997), Qi;t determines the amount of asset i than can be purchased by one








 capital i. In the standard neoclassical one-sector growth model Qi;t = 1 for
all t, that is, the amount of capital that can be purchased from one unit of
￿nal output is constant. Greenwood et al. (1997) consider that structures
can be produced from ￿nal output on a one-to-one basis but equipment are
subject to investment-speci￿c technological change. However, in our model,
Qi;t may increase or decrease over time, representing technological change
speci￿c to the production of each capital. In fact, an increase in Qi;t lowers
the average cost of producing investment goods in units of ￿nal good.
The problem faced by the consumer is to choose Ct, Ot, and It to max-
imize the expected utility (1), subject to the budget constraint (2) and
the law of motion (3), given taxes
￿
￿c;￿k;￿l￿





The problem of ￿rms is to ￿nd optimal values for the utilization of labor
and the di⁄erent types of capital. The production of ￿nal output Y requires
the services of labor L and six types of capital Ki, i = 1;:::6. The ￿rms rent
capital and employ labor in order to maximize pro￿ts at period t, taking










where At is a measure of total-factor, or sector-neutral, productivity and




i=1 ￿i ￿ 1, and ￿L = 1 ￿
P6
i=1 ￿i. Final output
can be used for seven purposes: consumption or investment in six types of
capital,




where both output and investment are measured in units of consumption.
2.3 Government
Finally, we consider the existence of a tax-levying government in order to
take into account the e⁄ects of taxation on capital accumulation. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the government balances its budget period-by-period
by returning revenues from distortionary taxes to the agents via lump-sum
transfers Tt. The government has no role in our model and obtains resources








 tal. Consequently, the government budget constraint in each period is:
￿cCt + ￿lWtLt + ￿k
6 X
i=1
Ri;tKi;t = Tt: (6)
2.4 Equilibrium
























￿t￿1 = 0; (9)
for each i = 1;:::6. ￿t is the Lagrange multiplier assigned to the constraint
dated at t. Combining (7) and (8) we obtain the condition that equates
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the












Equation (9) is a set of Euler equations that equate the marginal cost of
additional capital with the expected return to the investment for each type













Condition (11) implies that marginal rate of consumption equates the rates
of return of the six investment assets.






























that is, the ￿rms hire capital and labor such that the marginal contribution
of these factors must equate their competitive rental prices.















 First order conditions for the household (10) and (11), together with
the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm (12) and (13), the budget constraint
of the government (6), and the feasibility constraint of the economy (14),
characterize a competitive equilibrium for the economy.
2.5 The balanced growth path
Next, we de￿ne the balanced growth path, in which the steady state growth
path of the model is an equilibrium satisfying the above conditions and
where all variables grow at a constant rate. The balanced growth path
requires that hours per worker must be constant. Given the assumption of no
unemployment, this implies that total hours worked grow by the population
growth rate, which is assumed to be zero.
According to the balanced growth path, output, consumption and in-
vestment must all grow at the same rate, which is denoted by g. However,
the di⁄erent types of capital would grow at a di⁄erent rate depending on
the evolution of their relative prices. From the production function (4) the







where gA is the steady state exogenous growth of At. Let us denote gi as
the steady state growth rate of capital i. Then, from the law of motion (3),




with ￿i being the exogenous growth rate of Qi;t. Therefore, the long run
growth rate of output can be accounted for by neutral technological progress
and by increases in the capital stock. In addition, expression (16) says
that the capital stock growth also depends on technological progress in the
process producing the di⁄erent capital goods. Therefore, it is possible to










Expression (17) implies that output growth can be decomposed as the
weighted sum of the TFP (neutral technological progress) growth and em-
bedded technological progress, as given by f￿ig
6
i=1. Along the balanced
growth path, growth rate of each capital asset can be di⁄erent, depending
on the relative price of new capital in terms of output. A particular capital








 growth rate higher than the output growth rate. On the contrary, capital
assets whose relative prices increase, will grow over time at a lower rate than
output.




































where the subscript ss denotes its steady state reference.


































3 Data and Calibration
Expressions from (22) to (26) de￿ne a system of ￿fteen equations, which
is used in the calibration exercise. Values must now be assigned to the
parameters of the model. These are two related to preferences, three for
taxes and thirteen for technological parameters. The above system of ￿fteen













Data on GDP, labor (employees and hours), capital assets, (real and nom-












Qi = CPI ￿
Real investment in asset i
Nominal investment in asset i
; (27)
where CPI is the consumption price index (line 111.64 of IMF-IFS). This
represents the amount of asset i that can be purchased by one unit of the
consumption good. The ￿rst column in Table 1 reports the changes in
average price of the six assets, ￿i = 1
T
PT
t=1 Qit=Qit￿1, for observations from
1980 until 2004. While implicit technological change from the non ICT assets
is apparently negligible across the period, i.e. f￿i ’ 1g
3
i=1, price changes are
considerable for the ICT inputs. The amount of hardware equipment that
can be traded by one unit of output has increased by 16% per year. This
increase is over 3% per year for communication equipment and software.
Implicit technological change, as measured by the evolution of Qi, seems to
be speci￿c to the ICT equipment.
The depreciation rates f￿ig
6
i=1 have been computed as the ratio of invest-
ment resources devoted to depreciation over the gross capital stock, using
the GGDC data base. These estimates are shown in the second column of
table 1. Structures depreciate by 2.8% a year. This rate represents the half
of that assumed by Greenwood et al. (1997) of 5.6%. The rates of depreci-
ation of ICT equipment are high. A brand new software license depreciates
in about two years. This time length is four years for hardware equipment.
The third column of table 1, ￿nally, reports the portfolio weights as
averaged over 1980-2004,
P6
i=1 !i = 1. Note that three quarters of total
investment is allocated on non ICT inputs,
P3
i=1 !i = 0:7666, precisely
the assets where technological change is not embedded. We also assume a
long run saving ratio of 0:17, and that the gross long run growth rate for
productivity is g = 1:0183 (i.e. 1.83%).
From to the GGDC data base, the labor income share is set to ￿L =
0:7060 as averaged over 1980-2004, which coincides with that used by Green-
wood et al. (1997) for data that spread over 1950-1990. Tax rates are
borrowed from BoscÆ et al. (2005), who extend the methodology proposed
by Mendoza et al. (1994) to estimate e⁄ective average tax rates for U.S.
for the period 1964-2001. Average values over 1980-2001 are ￿c = 0:0465,
￿l = 0:2300 and ￿k = 0:3302.








 Asset Prices Depreciation Weights
Constructions and other structures ￿1 = 1:0008 ￿1 = 0:0278 !1 = 0:361
Machinery and other equipment ￿2 = 1:0094 ￿2 = 0:1302 !2 = 0:295
Transport equipment ￿3 = 1:0075 ￿3 = 0:1879 !3 = 0:110
Hardware and other o¢ ce equipment ￿4 = 1:1645 ￿4 = 0:2417 !4 = 0:086
Software ￿5 = 1:0380 ￿5 = 0:1088 !5 = 0:070
Communication equipment ￿6 = 1:0439 ￿6 = 0:4188 !6 = 0:076
Finally, the remaining parameters will be determined through a calibra-
tion exercise, using the steady state representation of the ￿rst order con-
ditions: f￿ig
6
i=1 and f￿;￿g.1 Technology parameters are found as ￿1 =
0:1167, ￿2 = 0:0823, ￿3 = 0:0305, ￿4 = 0:0233, ￿5 = 0:0205, ￿6 = 0:0198,
and preference parameters are found as ￿ = 0:9895 and ￿ = 0:4879.
4 ICT contribution to productivity growth
Using the parameters calibrated in the above section, we proceed to study
the quantitative importance of investment-speci￿c technological change in
explaining labor productivity growth in the U.S. over the period 1980-2004.
The period is also spitted into two intervals, 1980-1994 and 1995-2004, in or-
der to investigate possible changes in the contribution of the di⁄erent factors
over the sample period. Expression (17) allows us to identify the contribu-
tion to growth of these six capital assets embodied technological progress
plus the contribution to growth from neutral technological change. The con-
tribution to growth from each production factor technological progress and
the contribution to growth from neutral-technological change have been cal-
culated by assuming that the impact of remaining factors is zero (Greenwood
et al., 1997).
Table 2 shows the estimated values of the calibration exercise, given the
growth balance path. We present both the observed rate of labor produc-
tivity growth and the calibrated one, in order to see the accuracy of this
exercise. While the actual observed average growth rate of productivity is
1.83%, our calibration reports a value of 2.06% a year for this variable. This
slight di⁄erence between both growth rates comes from the fact that we
calibrate the balanced path of the U.S. economy, which is unlikely to be
the same than the actual one. This result indicates that over the period
1980-2004 the labor productivity in U.S. had grown at a lower rate than its
long-run productivity growth rate.
The contribution to productivity growth of neutral-technological change
is larger than that of the speci￿c-technological change. With only neutral
(TFP) technological change, output per hour worked would have grown at








 1.17% per year whereas with only speci￿c-technological change labor pro-
ductivity would have grown at 0.89% per year. This result implies that
about 57% of labor productivity growth over the period 1980-2004 was due
to neutral-technological change, with speci￿c-technological change providing
the rest. This result contrasts with the one obtained by Greenwood et al.
(1997), where productivity growth in the period 1954-1990 is dominated by
speci￿c-technological change, which accounts for about 60% of productivity
growth, with neutral-technological change accounting for the rest. How-
ever, it is important to note that the sampled period used by Greenwood
et al. (1997) is mainly governed by the total factor productivity slowdown
since the early 1970s. In contrast, our sample period is characterized by an
important recovery in TFP growth in the U.S. economy from the mid 1990s.
The e⁄ect of non-ICT technological change on output per hour worked
is negligible, 0.16 percentage points, mainly due to the technological change
embodied in machinery equipment (0.11 percentage points). The contribu-
tion of structures is zero, con￿rming the assumption of Greenwood et al.
(1997) that structures are produced from ￿nal output on a one-to-one basis,
evincing no speci￿c technological progress. The contribution to productivity
growth from transport equipment is also insigni￿cant, merely 0.03 percent-
age points.
Results reported in Table 2 reveals the importance of ICT capital as-
sets in explaining productivity growth for 1980 to 2004. With only ICT-
speci￿c technological change output per hour would have grown by 0.73%
per year. Therefore, ICT technological change accounts for about 35%
(= 100 ￿ 0:73=2:06) of total productivity growth during the period 1980-
2004. However, this ratio increases across the sample period. "Hardware" is
the capital asset with the largest contribution. With only hardware techno-
logical change, output per hour would have grown at 0.50% per year, that
is, technological change associated to hardware equipment contributes about
a quarter of all productivity growth in the U.S. during this period.2 Soft-
ware contribution to productivity growth is around 0.10 percentage points
whereas the contribution from communication equipment is 0.12 percentage
points.
The last two rows in Table 2 compute how much of the technological
progress is accounted for the neutral source and the implicit source. For
the overall period, about 43% percent of technical progress is associated to
the implicit change within these assets. These results sensibly contrast with
that obtained by Greenwood et al. (1997), where the implicit change is 58%
of labor productivity growth. Also, our result approaches to that of Bakhshi
and Larsen (2005) for the U.K. economy, where implicit technological change
2Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliver and Sichel (2000) for the U.S. and Jalava and
Pohjola (2002) for Finland, all of them using a traditional growth accounting approach,








 ranges within an interval from 20% to 30%.
The larger average productivity growth in 1995-2004, compared to that
of the period 1980-1994, was mainly due to neutral technological change,
given that contribution from speci￿c-technological change was fairly stable
during both periods. In fact, speci￿c-technological change contribution to
productivity growth was 0.85 and 0.95 percentage points in both periods,
respectively. Contrary, contribution from neutral-technological change was
0.74 percentage points in the ￿rst subperiod but 1.89 points in the second.
Therefore, the larger labor productivity growth in the U.S. since the mid
1990s is mainly due to the recovery of the TFP growth.
The larger level of disaggregation used in this analysis reveals that the
approximately constant contribution to productivity growth from capital
deepening is due to the decreasing contribution from non-ICT assets and the
increasing contribution from ICT assets. As we can observe, the contribution
of non-ICT assets to productivity growth is close to zero in the period 1995-
2004, from a value of 0.23 percentage points in the period 1980-2004. This
change is mainly causes by the technical change embedded in structures,
with a negative contribution to productivity growth in this second period.
Overall, the contribution of speci￿c-technological change increases in the
second period thanks to ICT assets. Contribution to productivity growth
from machinery and transport equipment through technological progress
increases in the second period with respect to the ￿rst period.
Table 2: Productivity growth and sources of technological








 1980-1994 1995-2004 1980-2004
Productivity growth
Observed 1.41 2.52 1.83
Calibrated 1.59 2.84 2.06
Speci￿c-technological change 0.85 0.95 0.89
Non-ICT 0.23 0.02 0.16
Structures 0.13 -0.19 0.01
Machinery equipment 0.07 0.16 0.11
Transport equipment 0.02 0.04 0.03
ICT 0.62 0.93 0.73
Hardware equipment 0.39 0.68 0.50
Software 0.07 0.15 0.10
Communications equipment 0.14 0.09 0.12
Neutral-technological change 0.74 1.89 1.17
Decomposition
Speci￿c 53.5% 33.5% 43.2%
Non-ICT 14.5% 0.7% 7.8%
ICT 39.0% 32.8% 35.4%
Neutral 46.5% 66.5% 56.8%
The contribution to productivity growth from ICT assets increases sig-
ni￿cantly from a value of 0.62 percentage points in the ￿rst period to a
value of 0.93 percentage points in the second period. This implies that the
importance of ICT capital assets as factors driving the productivity growth
in the U.S. economy has increased from the mid 1990s.3 As noted above,
the larger contribution corresponds to hardware and other o¢ ce equipment
with a value of 0.39 percentage points in the ￿rst period and 0.68 percentage
points in the second. Interestingly, whereas the contribution of software also
increases (from 0.07 to 0.15 percentage points), the contribution of commu-
nication equipment decreases (from 0.14 to 0.09 percentage points).
5 Robustness of the results
In order to check whether these results are robust to some calibrated values,
we now perform a sensitivity analysis. There are important di⁄erences be-
tween our analysis and previous analysis in the literature using this method-
ology. First, we compute speci￿c-technological progress to all capital assets.
By contrast, for Greenwood et al. (1997) this type of technological change
is only associated to equipment, assuming no speci￿c-technological change
3Jalava and Pohjola (2002) also obtain that the contribution to output growth from
ICT in Finland has increased from 0.3 percentage points in the early 1990s to 0.7 points








 in structures. In the contribution of Bakhshi and Larsen (2005) speci￿c-
technological change is only linked to ICT capital assets, on the basis that
there is no speci￿c-technological progress in the production of non-ICT cap-
ital assets.
The second important di⁄erence is the level of disaggregation of capital
assets considered. One possible source of divergence of our results and those
from Greenwood et al. (1997) can be due to the six-assets disaggregation
we have implemented. Indeed, calibration of dynamic general equilibrium
models use at most two assets. This the case of Greenwood et al. (1997),
who distinguish between structures and equipment, and Bakhshi and Larsen
(2005), with ICT and non-ICT capital assets.
Table 3 calibrates the model and compute contributions to productivity
growth using three aggregated portfolios of physical assets: (1st) we only
distinguish between structures and equipment as in Greenwood et al. (1997);
(2nd) with three capital assets where equipment are disaggregated into ICT
and non ICT equipment, while keeping structures as a third di⁄erentiated
asset; and (3rd) with only two assets, ICT and non ICT assets (structures
plus non-ICT equipment) as in Bakhshi and Larsen (2005). Importantly,
these aggregations are calculated using the T￿rnqvist index that explicitly
takes account into the variation in relative prices of assets. For all the cases,
the aggregated capital stock and their implicit de￿ ators are computed.
The results from these exercises are reported in Table 3. We present the
evolution of the aggregated assets price in column ￿. Also, the calibrated
Cobb-Douglas parameters are presented in column labeled as ￿￿shares.
From Table 3, we would like to highlight the following results. First, pro-
ductivity growth obtained in all the exercise is very similar to the previous
calibration value, except for the 1st aggregation (only two assets: structures
and equipment) where the calibrated productivity growth is 2.24%.
Second, the contribution of structures from the ￿rst and the second ag-
gregations is very similar, 0.02 percentage points, consistent with the con-
tribution obtained in the previous analysis. This implies that structures
accounts for about 0.7% of productivity growth, indicating a technological
progress of this assets close to zero. By contrast, using the ￿rst aggregation
equipment accounts for about 40% of productivity growth. In fact, all aggre-
gations are robust to our previous result that speci￿c-technological change
ranges within a narrow interval [40%;43%].
The third aggregation is similar to the one used by Bakhshi and Larsen
(2005) for the U.K. over the period 1976-1998. While Bakhshi and Larsen
(2005) allow speci￿c-technological progress only in ICT capital assets, in our
case, we do not restrict limit technological progress the ICT assets. How-
ever, we obtain that non-ICT speci￿c-technological change contribution to
productivity growth is only 0.17 percentage points, that is, only explains
about 8% of productivity growth in the U.S. This result con￿rms the pre-









Therefore, the results derived from our analysis are very robust to the
level of disaggregation in the capital assets. This implies that our level
of disaggregation is more informative than those of previous approaches.
In fact, this allows to study the contribution of di⁄erent capital assets to
productivity growth in a more detailed way, without su⁄ering biases in the








 Table 3. Robustness check and portfolio aggregation, 1980-2004
1st aggregation
￿ ￿-shares Contribution Percentage
Structures (a1) 1.0010 0.1167 0.02% 0.7%
Equipment (a2) 1.0359 0.1773 0.89% 39.7%
Speci￿c-technological change (a3) = (a1) + (a2) 0.91% 40.4%
Neutral-technological change (a4) 1.33% 59.6%
Calibrated productivity growth (a3) + (a4) 2.24% 100%
2nd aggregation
￿ ￿-shares Contribution Percentage
Structures (b1) 1.0010 0.1167 0.02% 0.8%
Non-ICT Equipment (b2) 1.0090 0.1135 0.14% 6.9%
ICT Equipment (b3) 1.0836 0.0638 0.73% 34.8%
Speci￿c-technological change (b4) = (b1) + (b2) + (b3) 0.89% 42.5%
Neutral-technological change (b5) 1.20% 57.5%
Calibrated productivity growth (b4) + (b5) 2.09% 100%
3rd aggregation
￿ ￿-shares Contribution Percentage
Non-ICT Assets (c1) 1.0054 0.2302 0.17% 8.3%
ICT Assets (c2) 1.0836 0.0638 0.73% 34.7%
Speci￿c-technological change (c3) = (c1) + (c2) 0.90% 43.0%
Neutral-technological change (c4) 1.20% 57.0%
Calibrated productivity growth (c3) + (c4) 2.10% 100%
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied the importance of investment-speci￿c technological
change in explaining the U.S. productivity growth during the period 1980-
2004. Capital inputs are disaggregated into six capital assets, in line with
current typologies that distinguish between ICT and non-ICT inputs. This
asset structure allows us to decompose the sources of productivity growth
into a richer and more informative framework than previous studies do, also
using dynamic general equilibrium model. We conclude that the contri-
bution of the three non-ICT capital assets to productivity growth is close
to zero. The contribution of "constructions and non residential buildings"
is negative during the period 1995-2004 while the e⁄ect of the other two
non-ICT assets is still positive but weak.
Speci￿c￿ technological change in the U.S. economy over the period 1980-
2004 is mainly due to technological progress embedded in ICT capital assets.
While the contribution of ICT speci￿c-technological change to productivity
growth is about 0.73 percentage points, that of non-ICT capital assets is
only 0.16 percentage points. More interestingly, whereas the contribution of








 inputs is decreasing.
By contrast, neutral-technological change is the main productivity growth
force during the period. When this period is splitted, 1980-1994 and 1995-
2004, we also ￿nd that TFP contribution is larger in the second subpe-
riod. This is explained by the recovery in TFP growth of the U.S. economy
from the late 1990s onwards. These results imply that neutral technological
change accounts for a 57% of total labor productivity growth. About 43%
of productivity growth can be attributed to speci￿c technological change,
most of them due to technological change embedded in hardware equip-
ment. Comparing the subperiods 1980-1995 and 1995-2004, we obtain that
ICT contribution to productivity growth increases, whereas non-ICT contri-
bution decreases. These results support the view interpreting the increasing
importance of ICT assets as a leading force of the U.S. productivity growth
over the last decade.
Finally, this disaggregation of capital stock reveals that hardware equip-
ment account itself for an important fraction of both productivity growth
and the implicit technological growth. Particularly, the contribution of hard-
ware to the U.S. productivity growth is of 0.50 percentage points for the
whole period (0.39 points during 1980-1994 and 0.68 points during 1995-
2004). This result contrasts with that of Greenwood et al. (1997), where
implicit technological change plays a more relevant role. However, the dis-
crepancies in our ￿ndings with respect to those of Greenwood et al. (1997)
mainly re￿ ect di⁄erences in the sample period. With respect to this, we
have checked that our results are robust to di⁄erent criteria by considering
dissagregation. In that sense, the approach we follow points out the im-
portance of using this disaggregation schedule since it can provide a more
precise insights on the sources of productivity growth.
A major implication can be derived from this paper, namely, ICT have
heterogeneous e⁄ects on economic growth through di⁄erent channels de-
pending on the stage in the process of introduction and use of new techn-
logies in which the economy is. The case of U.S., a pioneering country in
the massive use of ICT, is revealing. At a ￿rst stage, the main positive
e⁄ect of ICT capital inputs comes from using new equipments linked to new
technologies. Moreover, as some papers have shown (Samaniego, 2006), it
may be usual paying a price for being innovative in terms of adjustment
costs and smaller (even negative) TFP growth. The magnitude of the new
techological revolution may be so intense that high organizational costs may
arise at level plant. As the time goes by, new equipments begin to provide
signi￿cant productive services and, what is more important, allow a more
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